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**Information technology — Application  
security —**

**Part 7:  
Assurance prediction framework**

*Technologies de l'information — Sécurité des applications —  
Partie 7: Cadre de l'assurance d'une prédiction*



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## Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see [www.iso.org/directives](http://www.iso.org/directives)).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see [www.iso.org/patents](http://www.iso.org/patents)).

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation on the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: [www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html](http://www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html).

This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *Security techniques*.

A list of all parts in the ISO/IEC 27034 series can be found on the ISO website.

## 0 Introduction

### 0.1 Basic prediction

The project team declares an application secure when the supporting evidence demonstrates the attainment of the Targeted Level of Trust (ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011, 0.4.4). A security prediction occurs when the project team uses the supporting evidence from a previous version of the application and provides a rationale as to why the supporting evidence is still valid for the subsequent application. The security prediction framework is the process whereby organizations, who use ISO/IEC 27034 (all parts), perform risk analysis and document decisions made, relative to Application Security Controls (ASCs) performed on a previous version of an application but not performed on the current version. All such predictions are fundamentally subjective, and at best can only express a degree of confidence.

Today, individuals and organizations already transfer their confidence in security claims between versions of applications without any strong rationale supporting this transfer. Making a security prediction for a subsequent application, without any rationale or justification, is inherently a bad practice. To rectify this situation, this document establishes a framework by codifying requirements for making security predictions between versions of an application.

This document focuses on predictions, or claim transfers, related to subsequent versions of the same application.

### 0.2 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to help organizations to develop and use Prediction Application Security Rationales (PASR) in disseminating information relative to security properties of multiple versions of the same application by:

- a) providing additional guidance to Organization Normative Framework (ONF) Committees so that they can set up appropriate guidelines for when predictions are and are not appropriate for their organizations;
- b) providing the results of a risk analysis that contains the rationale as to why the changes in the subsequent application are not substantial;
- c) applying to application projects that are using an Application Normative Framework (ANF);
- d) indicating the Actual Level of Trust for the original and subsequent applications;
- e) indicating the Expected Level of Trust for the original, if used, and subsequent applications;
- f) providing the rationale as to why the risk analysis, predictions for individual Application Security Control (ASC), and the Actual Level of Trust together produce the Expected Level of Trust; and
- g) verifying a PASR when the auditor chooses to rerun the corresponding ASC verification activity.

This document does not provide guidelines on:

- a) what is and is not an appropriate risk;
- b) what is and is not substantial change;
- c) when an application owner should or should not accept a specific risk; or
- d) when an acquirer should or should not accept an Expected Level of Trust.

### 0.3 Targeted audience

#### 0.3.1 General

The following audiences find values and benefits when carrying their designated organizational roles:

- a) managers;
- b) ONF Committees;
- c) project teams;
- d) domain experts;
- e) auditors;
- f) application owners; and
- g) acquirers.

#### 0.3.2 Managers

The manager roles are the same as in ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011, 0.3.2.

#### 0.3.3 ONF Committee

As described in ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011, 3.17, the ONF Committee is responsible for managing the implementation and maintenance of the application-security-related components and processes in the Organization Normative Framework. The ONF Committee:

- a) provides guidelines to project teams as to what is and is not a substantial change;
- b) evaluates, and documents, in the ASC, the risk of choosing the PASR over performing the ASC activity;
- c) reviews each ASC and determines if predictions are allowed and, if allowed, under what circumstances predictions are appropriate;
- d) documents the prediction determination in each ASC in the ONF;
- e) advises the application owner, when establishing the ANF, the estimated risk of using the PASR; and
- f) responds to requests from project teams to modify the prediction guidelines for specific ASC.

#### 0.3.4 Provisioning and operation team

As described in ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011, 0.3.3, members of provisioning and operation teams (known collectively as the project team) are individuals involved in an application's design, development and maintenance throughout its whole life cycle. The project manager is responsible for managing the ANF.

The project team:

- a) performs a risk analysis on the proposed changes to the application to determine if the changes are substantial;
- b) creates the PASR (as defined in [3.2](#)) for each ASC for which there is a prediction; and
- c) generates the Expected Level of Trust report.